

Course Manual: Collective Action and Interest Groups

Course Catalogue Number

7324A119IY

Credits

9

Entry requirements

Admission to the master Political Science

Instruction language

English

Time Period

2020-2021, semester 1, block 2 and 3

Location

Tuesdays 15h-18h via Zoom: <https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/83734809393>

Lecturer(s)

Joost Berkhout, d.j.berkhout@uva.nl, office REC B10.10, Zoom room for individual meetings: <https://uva-live.zoom.us/j/2343475626>

For contact information, see: <http://www.uva.nl/over-de-uva/organisatie/medewerkers/content/b/e/d.j.berkhout/d.j.berkhout.html>

Course Objectives

After this course, students:

- are familiar with the classic theories and contemporary research in the field of interest group politics broadly conceived.
- are aware of the various contextual factors that shape collective action and policy mobilisation, and explain differences in interest representation between interests, countries, issues and organisational types.
- have practised their argumentative, research design and other academic skills in writing and through in-class participation.

Course Content

An important part of politics occurs ‘at the gates of’ formal decision-making arena’s: business lobbying in favour of the deregulation of trade, student protests for better academic education, international aid provision in the aftermath of natural disasters or ad-hoc, collective support actions for undocumented migrants. These are examples of collective political action and interest group politics. Advocacy and lobbying thrives under some circumstances but are conspicuously absent in other situations: we know that some interests do not get organized at all, some collective action organizations do not manage to produce any meaningful political voice and some political campaigns are ‘like a tree falling unheard in a forest’. These differences potentially create inequalities in the political voice of groups in society and in the interests represented before government, as famously stated by Schattschneider (1960), ‘organization is the mobilization of bias’. In this course, we assess several explanations for such differences in the mobilization of citizens and firms, the organization of civil society and the representation of interests before government.

Students will become familiar with the classic theories and contemporary research in the field of interest group politics. The change-oriented collective social movement mobilization of citizens is commonly studied separately from the organized representation of business, professional or citizen interests in interest groups. We attend to the political scientific study of a broad range of organizational types: social movements, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, think tanks, business interest associations, lobby groups, individual companies and so on. These organizations are studied in diverse

contexts: in local, national, and international arenas, on multiple issues or domains, and in comparative perspective.

The course is of interest to students of several of the tracks offered. The final paper assignment allows students to choose a subject that matches their specialized interests and practise skills needed for the MA thesis.

Teaching methods/learning formats

The course will be taught in online seminar format. Seminars are three hours in length and held once a week. These are meetings with in-class assignments in break-out rooms and student-led roundtable discussions. A number of guest speakers present. The learning outcomes are assessed through several written assignments.

Course Evaluations & Adjustments of the Course

Several relatively small changes have been made in the 2016-2017 version, most notably the heavier weighting of the case assignment. For 2017-2018, a couple of additional minor changes have been made, most notably in hosting a larger number of guests during the seminar meetings and a somewhat stronger focus on interest groups compared to social movements. The course evaluations consistently appreciate the academic and practitioner guest talks. The 2017-2018 course evaluation indicated a preferences on the part of some students for a stronger emphasis on strategies and policy influence and a number of changes in the literature reflect that. Students also indicated that they would like to see more 'cases' in class meetings. The chairing session should therefore in the 2018-2019 version include case material. In 2019-2020, the teaching format was changed from 2x2 hours meetings per week to 1x3 hours. In 2020-2021, circumstances forced the module into an online format and the class-chairing assignment has been changed into a Roundtable assignment to offer a more structured set-up to practice verbal expression skills.

Manner & Form of Assessment and Assessment Requirements & Criteria

- Students are required to participate in accordance to Teaching and Examination Regulations of the Graduate School of Social Sciences, article B5.2.
 - In case you miss more than a single meeting, please contact the lecturer, in case of special circumstances or in case you miss two or more meetings, please (also) contact the study advisor
 - In groups: students organise a Roundtable on the topic of the week
- Case assignments (45%)
 - Discuss a case exemplifying the required readings covering the on-going week.
 - Deadlines: Mondays (12h)
 - **Three** times 750 (min) to 1250 (max) words
- Literature review of required and additional readings and on the topic of the final paper (10%)
 - Make sure to identify paper topic / idea before the end of November
 - 1500 to 2000 words, including research question
 - Deadline: Monday 7 December, 12h
- Final paper (45%)
 - Around 5000 words (literature review may be revised and reused in the final paper).
 - Deadline: 15 January, 12h in the afternoon. Grade is available within 15 working days after submission. Grading criteria closely match MA Thesis grading form (see last page of [Master Thesis Manual](#))
 - Deadline of reparation in case of grade lower than 5,5: one week after receiving feedback.

All written assignments should conform to the formatting requirements of the [Master Thesis Manual](#)

Specification of assignments:

Roundtable conversation:

In a group of around four students, you prepare, chair and participate in a Roundtable session of around thirty minutes in which you discuss the topic of the week. Substantively, you may focus on the required readings, a particular case, or a particular contemporary political development, or a combination of those. You collectively identify a couple of sub-themes and divide them for preparation among the group. You assign a chair who makes sure each Roundtable-participant will get the opportunity to contribute, and who structures the discussion. For example, see this [Roundtable on 'Lobbying in Times of Covid-19'](#), organized by the ECPR Standing Group on Interest Groups and chaired by me (recording starts at one minute or so). A schedule is made during the first meeting. You discuss your ideas of this prior to the meeting with the lecturer (eg in the last couple minutes of the meeting of the previous week). Make sure to include empirical cases and examples.

Three case assignments

In general: This assignment helps you prepare for the meetings; the deadline is therefore prior to the meeting where the topics are discussed. Focus on the literature of the relevant weeks: these are those of the week of the deadline and may also include readings of the preceding week. Choose one or two questions, arguments, findings or normative positions from the literature studied – this may be a very central point or something that surprised you or attracted your interest. It must be something that reoccurs in more than a single study and you find suggestions below. Explain the point selected and explain the differences and similarities among the authors studied. Relate this to a case. You may add your own perspective or question or refer to the class discussions. Case suggestions and weeks themes:

- Week 1 and 2
 - Patronage: assess finances of one (or multiple) of organizations listed as charities: see <http://www.cbf.nl/> (NL), <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission> (UK) or <http://www.guidestar.org/NonprofitDirectory.aspx> (US). Or from organizations receiving government subsidies, e.g. in the EU case listed in: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm
 - Relate to discussion on NGO funding:
 - <https://www.politico.eu/article/ayman-jallad-ayman-jallad-mystic-money-man-behind-brussels-activists-ngo-funding/>
 - <https://lobbyfacts.eu/>
 - Connective action: select from recent protest events, such as those in Hong Kong, around BLM, Extinction Rebellion, or various other movements.
- Week 3 and 4
 - Make use of the CIG dataset (or other relevant data made available).
 - Manipulating 'supply': (online) marketing techniques of any major citizen group may be chosen, e.g. in the field of environmental politics: WWF, Greenpeace, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Natuurmonumenten, and organizational members of the EEB (<http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/members/>).
- Week 5 and 6
 - Corporate political activities: select a company from the [Forbes 2000](#) and assess its political activity on the basis of news reports (e.g. search newspapers in [LexisNexis](#)) or based on its website / other sources.
 - Disadvantaged groups or issues: identify a relevant 'disadvantaged' group (Strolovitch)
 - Business bias: Within business (compare economic sectors) or business community versus citizens (e.g. on the basis of minutes or statements of consultation or parliamentary committee hearings: e.g. available via the Tweede Kamer website (select 'hoorzittingen en ronde tafel gesprekken'), the website of the UK houses of parliament (search Bill committee), for more info see: Helboe Pedersen, H., Halpin, D., & Rasmussen, A. (2015). Who gives evidence to parliamentary committees? A comparative investigation of parliamentary committees and their constituencies. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 21(3), 408-427.).
- Week 7 and 8
 - Inside-outside: Examine the media appearances of lobbyists appearing in any parliamentary or government sources (see suggestions above).

- Influence: relate media reports on lobbying to findings of academic research

Literature review

Think of this as the first part of a research paper on a specific research question, and more specifically, the first part of your final paper for this course. Start with an introduction of around 400 words in which you provide a clear statement of the 'Why' question motivating your research and justify the question: Why should we be interested theoretically, normatively or substantively? Subsequently, identify the literatures bearing on answering the 'why' question you have posed, summarize and critique each in terms of method and major findings and identify why there is a gap in the literature necessitating your paper. This totals between 1500 and 2000 words.

You may add a brief note in which you provide a brief section outline of the final paper. The section outline is not graded but can be discussed in the individual feedback meeting in December.

Final paper

Students are expected to write an academic paper of around 5000 words (text body) on one of the central topics of the course. More detailed instructions are provided on Canvas / in class.

In case of a grade lower than 5,5, students are allowed to repair their paper based on the feedback. The maximum grade of the repaired version is 6,5.

Inspection of exams/assignments, feedback

Students receive written feedback on the literature assignments and final paper. There are individual feedback meetings on the literature review and, on request, on the final paper.

Rules regarding Fraud and Plagiarism

The provisions of the Regulations Governing Fraud and Plagiarism for UvA Students apply in full (except the rules regarding self-plagiarism when it comes to reusing the literature review text in the final paper). Access this regulation at <http://www.student.uva.nl/preventfraud-plagiarism>

Literature/materials

See references in the programme. All articles are available online (through the UvA network). Please refer to Canvas for further availability.

Date Final Grade

Simultaneous with the final paper grade.

Programme description per week

Mobilisation bias: The logic of collective action (week 1 and 2):

In week 1, we evaluate a crucial phase in the development of political science, more specifically the clash between the pluralists of the Fifties and their critics in the Sixties, and the pivotal place of the study of collective action (groups and movements) in that clash. The pluralist 'group approach' is dominant in American political science in the Fifties, but is seriously challenged on normative, empirical and conceptual grounds, as noted by Lowery and Brasher (2003, chapter 1, also see: Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, 44-63). Central in this respect is the publication of Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* (1965) which fundamentally changed the study of groups. As noted by Oliver (1993, 273-274), prior to 1965 social scientists assumed mobilisation to be 'natural' and studied the implications of group behavior, whereas post-1965, 'they assume that collective *inaction* is natural even in the face of common interests, and that it is collective action that needs to be explained' (also see Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, 63-82). And this, in turn, produced a new generation of researchers challenging Olson's *Logic*. We read a textbook-chapter and we study an excerpted, summarised version of the Olson's book accompanied by a reflection on the disciplinary relevance of Olson's work (Lowery, 2015).

In the additional readings, you will find an outline of formal sociological theories of collective action with specific formal critique of Olson (Oliver, 1993). Furthermore, as discussed in Lowery and Brasher (2003, 37 and further) Wilson and Salisbury, respectively, add expressive of solidary incentives that individuals may have when joining groups to the 'material incentive' structure of propagated by Olson (Salisbury, 1969; Wilson, 1974). Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 44-82) provide further details on the debates between pluralists and critics, and Olson and critics.

In week 2 we look at studies that challenge parts of Olson's *Logic*. To start, Walker (1983) explicitly challenges Olson on specific empirical grounds. In a much-cited, classic research article, Walker (1983) points at the critical role of patronage in collective action; government funding, critical philanthropic donors and others, are sometimes fundamental in initiating and sustaining cause groups. Furthermore, recent studies, most notably Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have revived some of Olson's notions in order to assess collective action through social media. Traditional 'organized' collective action presumably has higher barriers than the 'connective' action coordinated through various new media (Twitter, Facebook, sms, and so on). De Bruycker and his co-authors identify an important difference between business and non-business interest groups regarding the implications of collective action problems when interest groups engage in lobbying. Jordan and Maloney (1998) point out that individuals have a broad range of interests and preferences, some of which they may not even be aware of, and consequently are potentially willing to support various causes. This produces the situation in which citizens eventually end up supporting causes on which professional organizations put forward sophisticated political marketing strategies rather than the causes in which citizens are sincerely interested. In other words, the 'supply' of groups matters more than the actual 'demand' on the

part of citizens; something that is unlikely to lead to something that comes close to unbiased interest representation, especially given the selective targeting of certain segments of the citizenry in terms of socio-economic status and socio-political positions.

In the additional readings Lowery et al (2005) situate the *Logic* within the context of studies of communities of interest groups and highlight that systems of interest groups must be understood as shaped by both societal 'bottom-up' factors, such as those indicated by Olson, and 'top-down' factors related to politics and inter-organizational dynamics. Jordan and Maloney (2006) examine whether 'non-joiners' have 'rationally' chosen to free ride, or whether they are just sceptical about the likely success of collective action. Lohmann (2003) identifies the imperfect or incomplete nature of the information that individuals have about their own interests, and, hence, their (collectively detrimental) tendency to defend their own interests better than collective interests. Jordan and Maloney (1996) further stipulate the non-material incentives of members (explicitly de-emphasized by Olson) and add that these incentives are, to a certain extent, 'created' by interest groups through their recruitment strategies, rather than that they originate autonomous, individual considerations of citizens. Sanchez-Salgado (2014) assesses the effect of EU funding on the EU civil society, and notes that such funding provides a meaningful and just corrective to the relatively strong mobilisation of business and other interests.

Inequalities in organization (week 3)

This week we read another 'classic' text in this field of study: Schattschneider's *The Semisovereign People*. Similar to Olson, his work is a response to the pluralist group approach of the Fifties but in contrast to Olson, his study is less formal and more normative. His key point is that the interests represented through the 'pressure system', compared to party system, are very narrow in scope and biased in favour of the 'upper-class'. 'Public' or general interests are not represented, nor do disadvantaged interests, ie those without 'resources', gain voice through interest groups. This argument has resonated strongly in subsequent empirical studies in the field:

Hanegraaff et al (2017) examine the demographic structure of interest group membership on the dimensions on which one should expect substantial differences (education, gender, ethnicity). Their findings pessimistically show important inequalities in the constituencies of interest groups, but, more optimistically, indicate that this is not additionally strengthened in the outreach patterns of policy makers (except for associations with dominantly female members, but the authors do not satisfactorily/convincingly explain why this is the case). The CIG dataset used by these researchers is available for use in the final paper (and other assignments).

Strolovitch (2006) focusses on sub-groups within organizations advocating on behalf of the disadvantaged. While Schattschneider argues that interests of the disadvantaged are underrepresented in general, Strolovitch further problematizes this, when she finds that in cases where disadvantaged have organized a voice such as in the National Organization for Women in the United States, these mainly focus on issues of concern to relatively privileged constituents of the group.

Marien et al (2010) depart from an individual participation perspective. They try to find out which citizens are more likely to participate politically, especially in a ‘non-institutional’ manner, such as through social movement participation or interest group membership. Both highlight that richer, more educated persons are more likely to participate politically, but also point at several additional characteristics such as civic skills and gender. Schlozman et al (2015) presents data on the composition of the American interest group system over time and in terms of differences between distinct interests.

In the additional readings, Walker et al (2011) empirically assess the ‘the decline of traditional membership organizations and their replacement by professional advocates’, motivated by the concern that this is ‘related to the decline in civic capacity’. They optimistically conclude that traditional membership organizations and non-membership professional advocates co-exist in a largely mutually beneficial manner.

Interest group bias more broadly (week 4)

As outlined in Lowery et al (2015), Schattschneider’s work also raised the question what an ‘unbiased interest community’ would look like. In the discussion note by Lowery et al (2015), several scholars suggest distinct criteria that potentially indicate the extent to which interest communities are ‘biased’.

Several studies present an empirical assessment of Schattschneider’s claims. Rasmussen and Carrol (2013) deal with bias towards business interest representation, both in terms of actual numbers and lobby activities. They find ‘very obvious’ aggregate numerical business dominance, with even stronger dominance when looking at the lobby on EU consultations. Especially regulatory proposals in which the costs are concentrated lead to a ‘biased’ pro-business mobilization of interests. Flöthe and Rasmussen (2018) further identify the differences between business and non-business interests, and relate those to the intermediary role groups may have in relating public concerns to policy makers. Schlozman et al (2012) assess the US case and identify an increase of interest group bias over time.

Business interests (week 5)

Salisbury (1984), in a much-cited study, observes that the community of lobbyists in Washington consists of a wide variety of organizations – ranging from membership groups, associations, to local governments and major firms. He notes that studies of interest groups too frequently conceptually assume that associations are the prime interlocutors for policy makers, whereas, empirically ‘institutions’ (here meaning various non-membership organizations) also and perhaps most centrally constitute an important part of the policy participants in Washington. Hojnacki et al (2015) and Aizenberg and Hanegraaff (2017) revisit this observation in a contemporary context and identify the drives of corporate political activities.

Hanegraaff and Berkhout (2018) challenge the heavily-emphasized notion that political institutions structure the ‘demand’ for policy information – presumably and implicitly favoring business interest representatives (as presumably superior deliverors of ready-to-use technical information). Rather, they note the critical

differences among issues (their salience, scope and so on) that structure the types of interests attracted to them. In simple terms, it is commonly assumed that business interests work on 'low-salient' issues and that citizen groups are attracted to issues that are salient among the public and in the media. These differences, subsequently, are more important drivers of a 'pro' business bias (but in unexpected ways) than the needs of policymakers for 'technical' information.

Regarding the additional readings, Berkhout et al (2015) examine the contours of the business lobby in Brussels and find that economic, structural factors explain the variation in the numbers of lobbyists per economic sector, rather than the nature or impact of EU policy making (also see [LSE weblog](#)). Hansen et al (2005) examine collective and individual political action on the part of firms and point out that firms seek from government very specific benefits such as contracts or regulatory exemptions. This motivates them to lobby and, not foreseen by Olson, their particular interests spills over into collective action. The two articles by Lowery and co-authors review the arguments on bias (2004) and point to empirical mechanisms underlying bias in interest representation (2005). Smith (2000) notes the important conditioning effect of public opinion and business unity on the political influence of business. Streeck et al (2006) depart from a neo-corporatist perspective and focus on the activities of business interest associations in several European countries. Hart (2004) argues in favor of a theoretical and empirical treatment of business interest representation that is distinct from 'regular' studies of interest representation. The organizational particularities of 'the firm', the commercial rather than ideological core aims and the low-visible strategic approach, in his view, justify a separate theoretical treatment. This contrasts with most of the studies in this course.

The agenda-setting power of organized interests and their relations to political parties (week 6)

Lowery (2013) notes the 'dirty little secret' of interest group studies: the systematic research finding that lobbying tends to be ineffective in influencing public policy. In his well-argued literature review, he (2013) lists the reasons why this may be the case – ranging from the research challenges of defining and measuring influence to the idea that interest groups most of the time are not aiming at influencing policy makers, but pursue other goals. Baumgartner (2010) evaluates the implications of a number of ideas of Schattschneider, introduced in week 4, for the agenda-setting activities of interest groups. He highlights the (issue) dynamics of the policy process, and the ways in which these may favour particular interests over others. Kimball et al (2012) examine the issues represented by Washington lobbyists and evaluate the extent to which these match the issue concerns of different segments of the public. They find 'evidence that the lobbying agenda does not reflect the policy priorities of the public'.

Klüver (2020) and Berkhout, Hanegraaff and Statsch (2019) explore to collusion of interest groups and political parties in setting the agenda.

In the additional readings: Hacker and Pierson (2014) set themselves a high bar: they would like all political scientists to refocus their research attention. They would like the scholarly community to focus on ‘policies as a prize’ rather than ‘winning elections’. This may not be the same because of a tendency on the part of leaders of governing parties to strategically use the variation in public saliency of issues ‘to combine symbolic responsiveness to voters and substantive responsiveness to interest groups’ (Hacker and Pierson, 2014, 651). Their argument must lead to a revision of the relationship between political parties and interest groups.

Strategies: inside vs outside lobby (week 7)

One of the central assumptions in interest group studies is that business interests tend to choose an ‘inside’ lobby strategy aimed at policy makers and that ‘public’ interest groups tend to ‘go public’ to promote their cause. This argument is specified theoretically and empirically studied by Dur and Mateo (2013) (also see their 2016 book *Insiders versus Outsiders*). They present a country comparative study and find systematic evidence that ‘group type’ explains strategies; with business groups choosing an inside lobby and others ‘going public’.

As regards outside strategies and as noted by Thrall (2006), this does not imply that mass media coverage is a ‘weapon of the weak’. At least in the US case, the working procedures of journalists seem to lead the media to prioritise relatively powerful actors. This favors insiders.

Woll (2012) more broadly substantiates the institutional shapers of lobbying styles; contrasting US and EU lobby styles and the ways these are shaped by particular institutional rules, most notably, the incentives towards consensual policy making in the EU case, and the ‘winner-takes-all’ mechanisms present in the US.

In the additional readings: Binderkrantz et al (2017) note that, with important qualifiers, this finding of high levels of ‘concentrated’ media attention to a few strong political players is shown to have relatively strong cross-country validity. As regards inside strategies, Fraussen et al (2015) identifies ‘degrees’ of insiderness, particularly relevant in cases of formal institutional access. Binderkrantz et al (2015) focus on Denmark and look at a more aggregate level when they compare arenas rather than groups. They find support for the idea that there is ‘cumulative inequality’ in the access of groups to different arenas; those who have a dominant position ‘inside’ government, also have that in the media. Keck and Sikkink (1999), in a hypothesis similar to the arena-shifting argument by Binderkrantz et al (2015) open up the possibility of ‘losers’ of national conflicts to seek redress at the international level, therewith creating ‘boomrang’ effect. Both Fraussen and Wouter (2015 and Weiler and Brandli’s (2015) take up a similar question as Dur and Mateo. Bolleyer and Weiler (2018) conceptually and empirically assess the circumstances under which interest groups become politically active. They identify the organizational constraints interest organizations are commonly subject to. Mahoney and Baumgartner (2015) look at the US case and point to the importance of the structure of the policy conflict in explaining favourable treatment by government officials. Beyers and Kerremans (2007) highlight the organizational constraints of interest organizations when ‘shopping’ at different levels of government, in their case of ‘domestic’ groups becoming active at the European level. Hanegraaff et al extend the work of Beyers and Kerremans (2007) in the context of lobbying at the WTO conferences.

Who wins, who loses? Political influence (week 8)

The empirical studies of Dür et al (2015; 2018) assess the success of business actors in the EU. Dür et al (2015) note that ‘business routinely faces a defensive battle’ in the EU and tend to be unsuccessful in pushing the European Commission in the direction they prefer, especially on relatively conflictual issues on which also the EP is involved. Their book introduction situates this argument in a broader context. A similar method is used and conclusion is reached by Klüver (2013). Both studies may be criticized for insufficiently attending to the prior positions or agenda priorities of the actors studies: This is important, and noted in a simplifying manner by Lowery, (2013, 5): ‘If I am hungry and a colleague asks me to go to lunch, my colleague’s influence on me is only of a very trivial sort’. Gilens and Page (2014) US study explicitly links influence to affluence, and received popular attention in the [Daily Show](#).

In the additional readings, Woll (2007) develops the relational dimension of power and consequently focusses more specifically on the interests, preferences and power of government actors – which sometimes structurally favors business actors. Amenta and Caren (2004) discuss the ‘influence’ or ‘outcomes’ of social movement activities. Rasmussen (2015) assess influence in the EU case qualitative manner. The recent article by Bunea (2019) may be read in a ‘meta’ perspective; it assesses the lobbying on lobby rules, and evaluates influence in a less formal manner

Programme: readings per week

Additional readings are listed as recommendations for those planning to write the final paper on the theme of the week and those with chairing responsibilities in that week.. There will be a number of guests throughout the course. This implies that we will now and then deviate somewhat from the programme stated below (ie sometimes the discussion of literature will be brought forward or delayed).

Week	Theme	Literature (when not alphabetically: listed in suggested reading order)
1	Introduction & The logic of collective action	<p>Lowery, D. & Brasher, H. (2003) <i>Organized Interests and American Government</i>, McGraw-Hill, Boston. Ch1, especially table 1-2 on page 18. PDF</p> <p>Olson, M. (1993) The Logic of Collective Action. Richardson, J.J. (ed) <i>Pressure Groups</i>. , Oxford University Press, USA: 23-37. PDF</p> <p>Lowery, D. (2015). Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. In Lodge, Marin, Edward C. Page, and Steven J. Balla (eds) <i>The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration</i>. : Oxford University Press,. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199646135.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199646135-e-7.</p> <p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baumgartner, F.R. & Leech, B.L. (1998) <i>Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science</i>, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 44-82, Chapter 3 • Lowery, D. & Brasher, H. (2003) <i>Organized Interests and American Government</i>, McGraw-Hill, Boston. Ch2, especially the section headed 'sidestepping the logic', PDF • Oliver, P. E. (1993). Formal models of collective action. <i>Annual Review of Sociology</i>, 271-300. • Salisbury, R. H. (1969). An exchange theory of interest groups. <i>Midwest Journal of Political Science</i>, 13(1), 1-32. • Wilson, J.Q. (1974) <i>Political Organizations</i>, Basic Books, New York. 30-55 PDF

2	<p>The logic of collective action: Olson's implications, recent studies and new technology</p>	<p>Lowery, D. & Brasher, H. (2003) <i>Organized Interests and American Government</i>, McGraw-Hill, Boston. Ch2, especially the section headed 'sidestepping the logic' from page 37, PDF</p> <p>Walker, J. L. (1983). The origins and maintenance of interest groups in America. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 77(02), 390-406.</p> <p>Bennett, W.L. & Segerberg, A. (2012) The Logic of Connective Action. <i>Information, Communication & Society</i>, 15(5): 739-768.</p> <p>De Bruycker, I., Berkhout, J., & Hanegraaff, M. (2019). The paradox of collective action: Linking interest aggregation and interest articulation in EU legislative lobbying. <i>Governance</i>, 32(2), 295-312.</p> <p>Jordan, G., & Maloney, W. A. (1998). Manipulating membership: supply-side influences on group size. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>, 28(2), 389-409.</p> <p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lohmann, S. (2003). Representative government and special interest politics (We have met the enemy and he is us). <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i>, 15(3), 299-319. • Lowery, D., Gray, V. & Monogan, J. (2008) The Construction of Interest Communities: Distinguishing Bottom-Up and Top-Down Models. <i>Journal of Politics</i>, 70(4): 1160-1176. • Jordan, G., & Maloney, W. A. (1996). How Bumble-bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation. <i>Political Studies</i>, 44(4), 668-685. • Jordan, G., & Maloney, W. (2006). "Letting George Do It": Does Olson Explain Low Levels of Participation?. <i>Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties</i>, 16(2), 115-139. • Sanchez Salgado, R. (2014). Rebalancing EU Interest Representation? Associative Democracy and EU Funding of Civil Society Organizations. <i>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</i>, 52(2), 337-353.
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