CHANGING THE GAME: ADDIOPIZZO’S MOBILISATION AGAINST RACKETEERING IN PALERMO
Abstract: This article analyses the business community and the anti-racketeering campaign
“Change shopping habits against paying extortion racket” (“pizzo”) launched by the organisation Addiopizzo in Palermo, Sicily. The aim of this campaign was twofold: to encourage consumers to support companies that were not paying protection money to the local mafia, and to support entrepreneurs that refused to pay for protection. To date, Addiopizzo has mobilised about 800 firms and 10,000 citizens. The experience in Palermo of anti-mafia business movements is perceived as a critical case where it is difficult to establish collective action among businesses due to a strong presence of organised crime. Drawing on the social capital theory and mobilisation research, three solutions to the collective action dilemma are identified in this article: mobilisation through organisations, recruitment through ties, and trust. These three solutions are complementary and point at the possibility that social movements can bring about social and cultural change in a context marked by high risk, distrust, and a lack of cooperative tradition. Furthermore, this article shows that the mobilisation of businesses followed different paths and, to some extent, varied over time. The analysis is built upon a unique dataset collected from 277 firms that joined Addiopizzo’s campaign between 2005 and 2011, and from interviews and informal discussions with about 100 entrepreneurs.
Keywords: Anti-mafia; Racketeering; Addiopizzo; Mobilisation of Businesses; Organisations; Trust; Italy* Carina Gunnarson is Associate Professor at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden. email: firstname.lastname@example.org
This article analyses the anti-racketeering campaign “Change shopping habits against the pizzo” (Contro il pizzo cambia i consumi), launched in 2005 by the anti-mafia organisation Addiopizzo. The campaign’s aim was twofold: to encourage consumers to use their shopping power to support firms that were not paying protection money and to support entrepreneurs that refused to pay and encourage them to report extortion attempts to the police. Activists described the difficulties of creating Addiopizzo as being on a par with “opening an Anglican church in Vatican City” (Forno and Gunnarson, 2010: 105). Yet, by August 2013, over 800 businesses and 10,000 consumers had joined Addiopizzo’s anti-racketeering campaign.
Palermo is a critical case where it is difficult to establish collective action between entrepreneurs due to the strong presence of organised crime. According to surveys carried out by Italian trade associations, the percentage of businesses that were the targets of extortion reached, on average, about 70 percent in Sicily, with the highest rates in Palermo and Catania, where an estimated 80 percent of businesses were paying for protection (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008: 227). Racketeering is widespread in Sicily, Campania and Lazio, but it is also a growing problem in other Italian regions. According to 2008 estimates, over 600,000 individuals were targets of extortion, paying an estimated 15 billion euros a year (SOS Impresa and Confesercenti, 2008: 9).
In spite of successful law enforcement over the past two decades (Paoli, 2007: 854) and a growing number of reports to the police from entrepreneurs, a senior police officer in Palermo described the current situation as “a vicious circle, not a virtuous one, which … has a rationale that we are trying to break”. At the same time as Palermo’s mafia groups have been weakened by the numerous arrests of mafia members in recent years, the economic crisis has increased businesses’ vulnerability to their influence.
Research shows that communities may be in different positions of equilibrium. While some communities are permeated by a lack of trust, high levels of corruption, distrust of government, and non-cooperation, others are characterised by high levels of trust, absence of corruption, tolerance and a spirit of cooperation (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Rothstein, 2005). While there is evidence of these two different equilibrium points, there are still few studies about the mechanisms that are in motion when people move from a state of non-cooperation to one of cooperation (Fukuyama, 1995; Uslaner, 2002; Jung, 2003; Stolle, 2003; Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009).
This article endeavours to partly fill this gap, focusing on Addiopizzo’s antiracketeering campaign and the entrepreneurs who have joined it. It shows the importance of social movements in bringing about social and cultural change in a context characterised by high risk, distrust, and a lack of cooperative tradition.
It analyses the mobilising mechanisms that pushed entrepreneurs to join Addiopizzo’s campaign against racketeering, focusing on mobilisation through organisations, personal recruitment through ties, and trust. Within-group differences are also analysed depending on which year the entrepreneurs joined the campaign. The article builds upon a unique data set consisting of 277 questionnaires completed by entrepreneurs that joined Addiopizzo’s campaign between 2005 and 2011. The material also includes interviews with key actors and informal discussions with about 100 entrepreneurs who took part in the survey.
The article is organised as follows. The first section outlines the unfolding of the “anti-mafia” movement in Palermo, describing Addiopizzo’s campaign, and presenting the situation as a classic collective action problem. Thereafter, three solutions to this collective action problem are discussed: (1) mobilisation through organisations, (2) individual recruitment through ties, and (3) trust. The third section includes operationalisations of the central variables, including information about the data collection and the sample. The fourth section contains a presentation and analysis of the results, including a discussion about other possible motivational factors that pushed entrepreneurs to join the campaign. The final section presents conclusions and comments on the results.
CHANGING THE GAME
The unfolding of the anti-mafia movement in Palermo
The Sicilian anti-mafia movement has developed in cycles and in reaction to external events. Strong reactions have followed murders of prominent politicians, prosecutors or civil servants, but periods of activism have been followed by periods of passivity (Jamieson, 2000: 39). The reactions after the murder of the Sicilian prefect Gen. Alberto
Dalla Chiesa in 1982 represent the first wave of a new anti-mafia movement that involved strong emotions and mass demonstrations. In the aftermath of the murder, a new form of agitation took hold which focused on developing educational initiatives and the promotion of civil society to increase citizens’ awareness of the mafia (Schneider and Schneider, 2003: 175).
A second wave of protests occurred in 1992, after two leading anti-mafia prosecutors —Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino—were killed. Once again, citizens took to the streets to show their anger and to protest against the mafia. Palermo’s then mayor, Leoluca Orlando, was re-elected on a strong anti-mafia platform in 1993, with 75 percent of the vote. A prominent theme in his manifesto was the launch of a “cultural revolution”, and he spoke of promoting a “Palermitan renaissance” that would reclaim the city from the mafia and return it to its citizens. More specifically, his program targeted young citizens with policies full of important symbolic value such as “Schools adopt monuments” (Gunnarson, 2008). This policy, combined with the work of many civic associations, represented a continuation of Falcone and Borsellino’s focus on the formation of younger generations and a broader engagement by civil society in the fight against the mafia (Jamieson, 2000: 127-8).
Following the assassinations of Dalla Chiesa, Falcone and Borsellino, several important laws against the mafia were adopted, and law enforcement agencies, particularly in Southern Italy, were extremely successful in arresting numerous renowned mafia bosses such as Toto Riina in 1993, Bernardo Provenzano in 2006 and Salvatore Lo Piccolo in 2007 (Paoli, 2007: 854). Yet, despite the massive mobilisation of the 1980s and 1990s, the issue of racketeering remained almost absent from public debate during these years.
With its focus on the role of consumers and businesses, Addiopizzo represents a new way of challenging the mafia’s territorial power. The campaign is an example of indirect policy measures that involve activities carried out by civil society and local public administration and aim at a long-term change of cultural habits or practices. These are in contrast to direct measures, which are anchored in criminal law and directly target the mafia’s activities (Paoli, 2007: 855; La Spina, 2008: 195).
Addiopizzo was established during a period marked by the absence of dramatic external events. A group of seven post-graduates in their 30s were talking about opening a pub, and a friend advised them to include costs for “protection” in their budget. This got them thinking about racketeering: what would they do if they were asked to pay for protection? They were already politically engaged, interested in issues relating to fair trade, globalisation, and the local territory (Forno and Gunnarson, 2010: 111). Addiopizzo’s first public appearance was anonymous and took place in May 2004, when Palermo’s city centre was plastered with small stickers that read “A whole population that pays the pizzo is a population without dignity”. A few months later, about 30 individuals had spontaneously joined the initiative, many of them university students in their 20s who already knew each other from their involvement in sport clubs, scouts, and anti-mafia groups or from campaigns against the WTO (Siino, 2008).
The mobilisation of consumers started with the anti-racketeering campaign “Change shopping habits against the pizzo”. In May 2005, 3,500 consumers were part of the campaign, declaring their commitment against racketeering in an open letter in the regional newspaper Giornale di Sicilia (Siino, 2008; Forno and Gunnarson, 2011: 109113). The mobilisation of businesses started thereafter. One year later, in May 2006, Addiopizzo officially presented the names of the first 100 entrepreneurs who had publicly declared their refusal to pay the pizzo (Addiopizzo, 2012).
Starting as a spontaneous initiative with an e-mail address serving as a meeting point for like-minded people, Addiopizzo formally registered as a committee in May 2005, one year after its first appearance. It has a written statute and defined positions, with a president, secretary, working groups, administration and an assembly. It is a nonpolitical and non-religious voluntary association, self-financed by private donations, the sale of promotional items, and financial support from the Sicilian region and the European Union (Statutes Addiopizzo, art. 7, 11). As of January 2014, more than 800 entrepreneurs and 10,000 consumers had adhered to the campaign, together with 32 producers, 38 associations, and 176 schools that are involved in anti-racket education.
Joining Addiopizzo’s campaign is a public visible act that breaks the traditional silence around protection money; the names and addresses of entrepreneurs who join are publicised on the Internet, in printed publications, and on maps. Each new member receives a sticker with the Addiopizzo symbol and is asked to display it on their shop window to attract customers. In addition to the campaign, Addiopizzo organises a yearly Festival, “Festa pizzo-free”, has a label for pizzo-free products, produces maps and guides to pizzo-free shops, runs a website, arranges seminars and meetings, organises activities with schools and, through Addiopizzo Travel, arranges pizzo-free trips. In 2007, Addiopizzo established the anti-racketeering organisation Libero Futuro, which supports entrepreneurs who report attempted racketeering. Addiopizzo has its own legal office and collaborates with many institutions, including the judiciary, the police, the University of Palermo, the Chamber of Commerce, and the major trade associations Confindustria and Confcommercio (Forno and Gunnarson, 2011: 44-65; Partridge, 2012: 6-7). It has become well-known at national level. President Giorgio Napolitano even visited Addiopizzo’s headquarters in September 2011.
A collective action problem
Despite the massive mobilisation against the mafia in the 1980s and 1990s, racketeering remained almost absent from the public debate. In the beginning of the 1990s, the entrepreneur Libero Grassi tried to mobilise the business community in Palermo against the pizzo. He became increasingly isolated and received no support from the business community, and his murder in August 1991 was described as “expected”, a clear warning from the mafia to entrepreneurs wishing to follow his example (Santino, 2000: 280). Now, years later, despite Addiopizzo’s mobilisation, the number of companies in Palermo that have joined the campaign remains limited: “most people still do not rebel against the mafia because the price for doing so is too high” (La Spina, 2008: 196).
The pizzo is a regular practice, which includes a long-term relationship between two parties. From a mafia’s point of view, racketeering represents the principal instrument through which control is exercised over the local economy in a specific territory (Gambetta, 1993: 31; Sciarrone, 2004: 22). The pizzo guarantees a regular flow of cash to the mafia, which is used to pay members’ salaries, to pay for doctors and cars, and to provide economic support for imprisoned mafia members’ families (Orlando, 2001: 141; Schneider and Schneider, 2003: 77-8). The pizzo may also be used as a first step towards the control or takeover of a legal company that is eventually used for money laundering (Santino, 2000: 274). Yet, economic gains relating to the pizzo are not the mafia’s principal interest; it is more important to make everybody within a specific territory pay as a sign of subordination to the mafia family and to establish a territorial dominance (Santino, 2008: 40).
For the individual entrepreneur, the pizzo is commonly paid for protection against thefts, robberies and personal property damage. The term “protection” could, however, be questioned, since the only real protection organised crime offers is protection against itself or against rival crime groups wishing to impose their power over the territory (Gambetta, 1993: 31). The pizzo can be very costly for the individual entrepreneur. Judicial evidence indicates an average monthly payment of about 600 euros per business, with significant variations between sectors and firms. A tobacconist pays on average 32 euros per month, whereas a big supermarket might pay 27,200 euros per month (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008: 228). The pizzo starts with a small sum that increases over time. Often, the mafia increases its control over specific businesses. A business owner may be forced to buy products or services from a specific company related to the clan, or forced to employ “a son, a relative or a friend”, who eventually takes over or imposes a double command on the company7.
Some benefits may be gained by those companies that pay for protection. For example, heavy insurance costs are reduced and rival extortionists are discouraged from approaching the protected firm (Gambetta, 1993: 174-77). A protected company could receive help in retrieving stolen goods, such as cars, bicycles, motorbikes or other equipment (Transcrime, 2008: 143; SOS Impresa, 2010: 15). The mafia provides access to mafia-controlled markets and suppliers, may intimidate creditors, debtors, or may silence workers and trade unionists who complain about their salaries or working conditions (Arlacchi, 1986; Gambetta, 1993: 15-33, 180-182).
A company that stops payments might lose clients, as the mafia imposes a monopoly on specific goods and services within its territory and “advises” the local community to purchase goods or services from the company it is “protecting”. Stopping payment is also likely to increase insurance costs (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008: 222).
Micro-realities vary enormously throughout Palermo. A majority of the joiners/members, both firms and consumers, are located in the most central and commercial areas of Palermo, whereas the number of joiners/members is considerably lower in other areas (see Appendix, table 8). Generally, the central districts have a favourable socio-economic environment compared with more peripheral areas, or borgate, where services are poor, unemployment rates are high and educational levels are low8. Refusing to pay is more risky in neighbourhoods with few joiners/members. Several respondents in our questionnaire admitted that racketeering was not readily discussed in their neighbourhoods9. In practice, they said, it was impossible to know who was or was not paying for protection10.
As shown above, there are different forms of racketeering and ways for the mafia to take control of private companies. Addiopizzo’s campaign mainly addresses the question of regular cash transfers to the local mafia. Pizzo and “protection money” will be used as synonyms throughout this article.
In a context such as Palermo, where most businesses continue to pay, what were the mechanisms that prompted some firms to join Addiopizzo’s campaign? What made them break away from a stable equilibrium of non-cooperation? Drawing on the social capital theory and mobilisation research, three solutions to the collective problem will be discussed in the following section.
the owner reduced to 1,000 euros through negotiations with his racketeers (respondent 193).
- Senior Police Officer, the Flying Squad, Palermo, May 4, 2012.
- Examples of such areas: Brancaccio, San Lorenzo, San Filippo Neri (ZEN), and Borgo Vecchio.
- Respondents: 41, 193, 368, 558, 644. Only respondent 41 had a store in central Palermo.
- Respondents: 34, 151, 468, 469, 608, 629.
Doug McAdam and Ronelle Paulsen (1993) suggest a three-step model for recruitment: 1) The individual is the object of a recruiting appeal, either directly from an agent or indirectly through media; 2) The individual has discussions with others who support the ideas of the movement; and 3) a decision is reached based on reflection and balancing different opinions and conflicting pressures (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993: 647).
In this section, two forms of direct recruitment will be discussed—(1) mobilisation through organizations and (2) recruitment through ties—and the potential of indirect recruitment to Addiopizzo’s campaign, focussing on attitudes of the potential member. The first perspective analyses the relevance of organisational membership for the mobilisation of entrepreneurs. This perspective only considers entrepreneurs who are already members of an organisation and ignores the mobilisation of entrepreneurs who are not known beforehand. Therefore, the second theoretical perspective examines the importance of personal recruitment, analysing the existence of personal contacts between a recruiting agent and an entrepreneur, where the entrepreneur is explicitly asked to engage in collective action (Tarrow, 1994: 20). Most likely, such contact includes a discussion and an attempt to persuade the entrepreneur to join. Yet, both perspectives ignore the attitudes or values of the potential joiner. Likely, some entrepreneurs joined the campaign because of their personal convictions. Therefore, the third analytical perspective focusses on attitudes of trust as a potential explanation for the mobilisation of entrepreneurs.
The three perspectives discussed—(1) mobilisation through organisations, (2) recruitment through ties, and (3) trust—are complementary and identify different mobilising mechanisms. The first perspective recognises membership in an organisation as a potential mobilising factor, the second acknowledges the importance of personal recruitment, and the third perspective analyses the relevance of personal attitudes or values of the entrepreneur.
Mobilisation through organisations
Robert D. Putnam argues in Making Democracy Work (1993) that voluntary associations function as schools in democracy, where their members learn to trust and cooperate with people different from themselves, which creates civic communities whose members engage in collective action. Yet research has returned mixed results in support of this theory (Nannestad, 2008: 423). Mobilisation researchers acknowledge organisational membership as one micro-structural factor that is linked to individual activism. Acquaintanceships made in formal organisational settings form structures of relational ties. Hence, belonging to an organisation is a good way to meet new people, which increases the likelihood of being pulled into social movements. Furthermore, movement organisers recognise the difficulty of recruiting isolated individuals, which is why they focus on mobilising support within existing organisations (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993: 644). In addition, organisation members may have ties to non-members and access to other social relationships that are not linked to the original organisation (Oliver and Myers, 2003: 178). From this discussion, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Addiopizzo mobilised entrepreneurs through existing organisations.
Recruitment through ties
A common explanation is that individuals are recruited into movements by people they know through various forms of social ties. Granovetter’s seminal article on “the strength of weak ties” has contributed to the understanding of diffusion processes and also of mobilisation processes (Boekkooi and Klandermans, 2013: 748). The core of Granovetter’s argument is that strong ties are valuable for the maintenance or reproduction of a group, for example the kinship group, but weak ties function as bridges to other individuals and are particularly useful for the dissemination of information across group boundaries (Granovetter, 1973; 1983: 202; Lin, 1999: 34; Putnam, 2000: 22-23; Teorell, 2003: 51). In other words, strong ties are inward looking —bonding—and reinforce the identity of the group, whereas weak ties are outward looking—bridging—and include people across social cleavages (Putnam, 2000: 22). Without bridging ties, an initiative does not spread beyond a close circle of friends and, consequently, most of the population will remain untouched. Furthermore, individuals without bridging contacts “may be difficult to mobilize or integrate into political movements of any kind” (Granovetter, 1983: 202). Bonding ties commonly refer to relationships with friends or family, while bridging ties are looser ones that connect the individual to groups other than familial groups.
In addition to social ties, various types of societal actors—ranging from associations to representatives of the state—could make personal contact to encourage individual entrepreneurs to join (Verba et al., 1995:17). Potential joiners could, for example, be contacted by phone, e-mail, letter, or a personal visit, or they may be approached in person at a meeting. In contexts where distrust at the interpersonal level Uslaner, 2002; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003; Fishman, 2004:101).
prevails or where we have insufficient knowledge about the people with whom we are interacting, this type of personal contact could be crucial for the decision to join. As suggested by McAdam and Paulsen, a decision to join entails discussions with individuals who support the ideas of the movement (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993: 647).
This leads to the formulation of two hypotheses. The first takes Granovetter’s work as a point of departure, focusing on the importance of bridging ties, commonly perceived as vital for diffusing information and engendering cooperation, while the second analyses the importance of activist ties, in this case Addiopizzo, for the recruitment of entrepreneurs.
- Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurs were recruited into the campaign through bridging ties.
- Hypothesis 3: Entrepreneurs were explicitly asked to join the campaign by activists from Addiopizzo.
Generalised trust is believed to make a person more willing to engage in collective efforts and cooperate with other people (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Ostrom, 2000; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003; Fishman, 2004). Commonly, generalised trust refers to the trust people have in others they do not know, for example, people met by chance in all sorts of public spaces. As Putnam shows, people who trust their fellow citizens engage more often in volunteering, contribute more to charity, participate more often in politics and community, and display many other forms of civic virtue (Putnam, 2000: 136-377). Quoting Uslaner, “[g]eneralized trusters are connected not just to other people but to their communities” (2002: 192). In contrast to generalised trust, particularised trust is the trust we feel towards those known personally from daily interactions, often people we define as close friends, family, neighbours, and relatives. A third form of trust—
identity-based trust—is based on a person’s identification with a specific group, for example, through shared behaviour, mores, proximity or traditions (Stolle, 2002: 401-2; Freitag and Bauer, 2013: 29). In general, it is assumed that people tend to trust others who are similar to themselves and with whom they share a group identity (Kramer 1999: 577-8; Cook et al., 2005: 27, 67). Vertical trust, or political trust, is different from social trust and commonly refers to trust towards the political system and its institutions.
Commonly, generalised trust is identified as the dimension of trust that makes people cooperate, while there is little evidence that particularised trust generates collective action. The extent to which identity-based trust is beneficial for collective action remains unexplored. This leads to our fourth hypothesis.
- Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurs with high levels of generalised trust joined the campaign.
Timing for joining
According to mobilisation research, it is likely more difficult to join a new initiative if members are few, if the outcome is uncertain and if the activity involves personal risks. Once the number of joiners has grown and the organisation and institutional support have strengthened, however, the personal risks and costs associated with joining an initiative decrease (Granovetter, 1973; McAdam, 1986). This leads to the final hypothesis, which examines within-group variation depending on which year the entrepreneur joined the campaign.
- Hypothesis 5: The mobilising mechanisms (organisations, ties and trust) vary over time depending on which year the entrepreneurs joined the campaign.
Mobilisation through organisations
The first hypothesis examines the relevance of mobilisation through existing organisations. Factor analysis identified five distinct groups of organisations. The first group consists of organisations engaged with issues of third world development, human rights, animal rights, and the environment (Cronbach’s α=.812). The second group represents anti-mafia organisations (other than Addiopizzo), for example, Libero Futuro and Libera (Cronbach’s α=.601). The third group consists of cultural, women’s and youth organisations (Cronbach’s α=.571). The fourth group includes political groups and trade unions (Cronbach’s α=.474). The fifth group relates to various trade associations, for example, Confcommercio and Confindustria (Cronbach’s α=.575). Based on the factor analysis, five different additive indexes were constructed (see Appendix, table 9).
Instead of analysing membership at the time of joining the campaign, we measure the joiners’ current membership in organisations. Yet, we estimate that membership is relatively stable over time and is also a valid indicator for the time of joining the campaign.
Recruitment through ties
The second hypothesis examines the relevance of recruiting ties for the businesses that joined the campaign. The analysis takes as its point of departure McAdam’s three-step model focusing on the two first stages in the recruiting process: 1) From which source did the joiner first hear about Addiopizzo? 2) Was he or she invited to join the campaign by someone? If so, by whom?
Both were closed-ended questions with a number of listed answers as well as space to write a personal response. The answers are grouped into four categories: bonding ties, bridging ties, activist ties, and no ties. Bonding ties are defined as those with family, relatives and friends. Bridging ties are defined as colleagues, customers, people met at a conference, or representatives of a trade association or the police. Hence, it is a broad category that encompasses different types of societal actors. Activist ties refer to contacts with activists from Addiopizzo or Libero Futuro. Respondents who joined the campaign on their own initiative were coded in a separate category labelled “no ties”.
Factor analysis confirmed four dimensions of trust: generalised trust, particularised trust, identity-based trust and vertical trust (see Appendix, table 10). Generalised trust was measured with the standard question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Along with three other items—trust in people met for the first time, trust in foreigners, and trust in business colleagues—an additive index was constructed (Cronbach’s α =.669). An index for identity-based trust was created based on three items: “trust in Sicilians”, “trust in Italians” and “trust in Palermitans” (Cronbach’s α=.851). Three different indexes for vertical trust were created. Trust in various anti-mafia actors is based on four items: trust in anti-mafia organisations, Addiopizzo, the justice system, and Banca Etica (Cronbach’s α=.716). An additive index for police trust was created based on three items: trust in the state police, the Carabiniere and the finance police (Cronbach’s α= . 914). The index for political trust is based on trust in parliament, the public administration, the parties, and the national, regional and local governments (Cronbach’s α = .850). (See Appendix, table 11.)
The dependent variable – timing for joining the campaign
The year of joining the campaign is used to analyse whether the different factors vary over time. The year of joining the campaign ranges from 1 to 7 for the year the entrepreneur was registered by Addiopizzo.
Three control variables will be used. Educational level is included since it is a factor that normally correlates with generalised trust. It is measured on a range from “no education” to “university degree”. A company’s years in operation is measured with an ordinal scale. A respondent’s age is based on his or her age at the time of the survey; ages range from 21 to 75.
The questionnaires were distributed and collected during two stays in Palermo: in October-December 2011 and in April 2012. Addiopizzo provided an updated list with names, addresses and the date when each company was registered as part of the campaign; it alerted the firms about our arrival through e-mail before the data collection started. All businesses were approached through personal visits, and we always asked to meet with the managing director. Despite the time-consuming research strategy, personal visits proved crucial for the response rate. Around 400 companies were approached, and a total of 277 questionnaires were returned and coded, representing a response rate of 68 percent.
In most cases the questionnaire was left with the owner and collected at an agreed date and time. The collection of questionnaires started in the most central areas and eventually expanded to other areas.
About 700 shops had joined the campaign according to Addiopizzo’s website when the data collection started. The number of owners was lower, approximately 550, which included companies in Palermo and in other cities. The following joiners were excluded
a priori from the sample: companies with locations in other cities (134); companies with owners in northern Italy (2); and cultural associations, sport clubs and individuals with limited or no commercial activities. In cases where the entrepreneur had several stores or when a store was part of a commercial chain, only the owner was approached (and the remaining stores excluded).
The sample was regrouped into eight different categories: 1) shops, 2) services, 3) bars, pubs, restaurants and entertainment, 4) professionals (doctors, architects, lawyers, sales agents), 5) tourism (hotels, travel agencies, bed and breakfasts), 6) associations, schools, sport clubs and cultural groups, 7) industry, construction and transport of goods, and 8) agriculture (production and promotion of products).
The average response rate was high, at 68 percent, with a higher response rate for individual firms (70 percent) than for chains or owners with several stores (48 percent). The response rate was higher than the average for tourism (82 percent), professionals (76 percent) and shops (74 percent). Shops and companies in the service sector were over-represented in the sample compared with the total population. Businesses in industry, construction, transport, and agriculture were under-represented, as the data collection concentrated on companies in Palermo (see table 1).
Table 1. The sample and the total population (% and N)
Most of the joiners in our sample were well educated: 49 percent had a diploma from higher secondary level and 43 percent had a university degree. Seventy-five percent of the respondents were male, with an average age of 45. In general, the companies were small, with less than six employees. Most of their clients came from the local territory: almost 70 percent had clients from the city of Palermo. A majority of the businesses had existed for more than 10 years, and only a small share had been in operation for less than two years.
Mobilisation through organisations
The first hypothesis examines whether the entrepreneurs were mobilised through different types of organisations. We already know that the first group of activists shared a background with groups that were engaged in activities related to fair trade, the effects of globalisation, and the development of the local territory, such as Attac, Rete Lilliput, Gruppo 23 Maggio, Palermoinbicicletta, the scouts, and the Global Justice Movement (Siino, 2008: 62-69).
When the mobilisation of businesses started in 2006, the strategy chosen was to use personal contacts and also use the networks of existing organisations, including anti-mafia organisations such as SOS Impresa or Coop Solidaria. According to one of the founders of Addiopizzo, it was Addiopizzo that approached these organisations, not the other way around. Meetings with individuals that had experience relating to protection money were organised for entrepreneurs interested in the campaign.
The role of trade associations was limited during the initial phase of the campaign, but in 2007 the regional trade association Confindustria stated that they would exclude entrepreneurs who were not reporting demands for pizzo to the police. Confindustria’s policy change was significant considering that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the organisation (then Assindustria) did not express support for the Palermitan businessman Libero Grassi, who had attempted to convince the business community to stop paying for protection. On the contrary, the then president of the organisation explained in an interview that their activities had other objectives and obligations than fighting the mafia (Santino, 2000: 276). Hence, Confindustria’s change in policy in 2007 represented a turning point and a break with the past, described by some as a
“Copernican revolution” (Conticello, 2008: 11-13). Four years later, the trade association Confcommercio decided to exclude members who were paying for protection and encouraged its members to join Addiopizzo’s campaign.
Our data shows that membership was most frequent in cultural organisations, trade associations, Libero Futuro, environmental organisations, sport associations, peace groups, and organisations related to third world development and human rights. Membership scores were lowest for women’s organisations, political parties and unions. On average, the entrepreneurs were members of 3.65 organisations. About 16 percent were not members of any organisation and 17 percent were members of only one organisation.
There was no significant difference between early and later joiners with regard to the number of memberships. Yet, when distinguishing between different types of organisations for entrepreneurs who joined the initiative in different years, the pattern described above was confirmed. Joiners who were members of various action groups— peace organisations, local community action groups, environmental organisations, or organisations engaged in third world development or human rights—joined the campaign at an earlier stage. Joiners who were members of trade associations tended to join the campaign later on, most likely as a consequence of the policy decisions made by their organisations. Membership in cultural and political organisations did not vary over time. The respondent’s age did not have a statistically significant effect in any model (see table 2).
Table 2. Membership in organisations (dependent variable, 1-7).
Estimates from OLS regressions.
Note: Dependent variable: year of joining. * Significant at the 0.1 level. **Significant at the 0.05 level. ***Significant at the 0.01 level. Entries in parentheses: standard errors.
Recruitment through ties
As shown in the previous section, activists played an important role in mobilising businesses. Contacts were made with entrepreneurs they already knew or with those identified through other organisations and personal networks. A former activist described the recruitment of two entrepreneurs: “it was simple… I was writing something for a newspaper for students and I had interviewed the owner of a company.
I already knew that he would be interested in joining… immediately after the interview I talked about Addiopizzo and he immediately said yes. A few minutes later I went to [X] office… and I approached a guy I knew and who was part of the editorial staff. He introduced me to the owner and he joined, too, without asking a single question”.
In addition to recruitment through personal contacts and existing organisations, Addiopizzo searched “in the dark” for entrepreneurs they did not know from before, for example, contacting entrepreneurs who had reported to the police. They approached neighbourhoods where mafia dependents had recently been arrested, thinking that entrepreneurs there might be interested in their campaign. They identified new companies through the local chamber of commerce, believing that owners of new businesses would be young and interested in joining. Targeted campaigns were organised, for example, in the commercial street Viale Strasburgo in 2010 and in the industrial area Brancaccio in 2012 (Addiopizzo, 2012).
During the first two years of campaigning, about 30 people were involved with recruitment, many of them university students. In most cases, companies were approached by two or three activists, who personally visited the owners. Several entrepreneurs who were part of the survey spontaneously said they had joined the campaign just because somebody had explicitly asked them to.
The data shows the central role played by Addiopizzo during the mobilisation, directly and indirectly. A large share of the joiners, 24 percent, had received information about Addiopizzo for the first time directly from an activist. About a third of the joiners, 31 percent, had received information about Addiopizzo indirectly through various media sources— newspapers, TV, posters, stickers and, to a limited extent, through the Internet. Twenty percent had heard about the campaign from relatives or close friends, and 18 percent from various forms of bridging ties (see table 3).
Table 3. Hearing about Addiopizzo for the first time, total (%)
Did someone invite them to join the campaign? Once again, the data shows the crucial role played by activists: more than two-thirds of the joiners were invited by an activist to join the campaign. In comparison, seventeen percent of the entrepreneurs were invited by friends or family members (bonding ties) to join Addiopizzo’s campaign and twelve percent were invited through various types of bridging ties. A large share of the respondents (32 percent) joined the campaign on their own initiative, without being asked (see table 4).
Table 4: Did someone invite you to join the campaign? If so, who?
Note: The individual items are rounded to the closest whole number before being added.
There was no statistically significant difference between various sources of information depending on which year the respondent joined the campaign. Yet, correlation analysis revealed an interesting pattern for personal invitations to the campaign. Whereas it was more frequent for entrepreneurs who joined the campaign at an earlier stage to be invited by friends or family (bonding ties) later joiners tended to be invited to the campaign through bridging ties (colleagues, customers, and so on). Also, later joiners were more likely than earlier ones to know a person who had already joined the campaign. This is hardly surprising; as the campaign unfolded and the number of joiners increased, it became more likely that entrepreneurs joining later would know someone who was already part of the campaign (Appendix, table 12).
The fourth hypothesis analyses whether entrepreneurs with high levels of generalised trust joined the campaign. According to one activist who was involved in recruiting entrepreneurs, distrust was widespread among many shop owners: “A lot of guys [ragazzi] went to the shops without knowing anything about the owners, and they were often turned down (…) There was a lot of distrust, because it was the first time that anyone had come to them with this kind of request, and also because there was a lot of fear of being exposed”.
In fact, 73 percent of the respondents said that they did not trust people on meeting them for the first time. In response to the standard question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 66 percent indicated a belief that one needs to be very careful when dealing with other people.
Compared with other regions in southern Italy, generalised trust among the respondents was relatively high, however, and equalled the levels in northern and central Italy. Trust in business colleagues and foreigners were also high, at 73 percent. Moreover, a majority of the joiners expressed high levels of trust in the justice system (71 percent), the police forces (73 percent), anti-mafia organisations (87 percent), and Addiopizzo (93 percent). Trust in the justice system was considerably higher in the sample compared with other Italian regions, while trust in the police was on a par with that in southern Italy.. Altogether, this data indicates that the joiners were more trusting than the average population in southern Italy, which may depend on the high level of education of the entrepreneurs in the sample. It also seems that Addiopizzo had established trust in its organisation among the businesses that joined the campaign. Trust in the political system was extremely low, but the respondents in Palermo did not differ from the national population in that regard (Diamanti, 2011).
Table 5. Trust levels (%)
An interesting finding was the large share of entrepreneurs who joined the campaign on their own initiative and without prior contact with a recruiting agent. These joiners had received much of their information about the campaign through various media sources but also from activists.
Logistic regression analysis was used to examine whether those who joined the campaign on their own initiative had a higher level of generalised trust than other respondents. We found a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, meaning that individuals with a high level of generalised trust tended to join the campaign on their own initiative (see table 6).
A positive and significant effect of education on the dependent variable was also found, showing that people with higher levels of education were more likely to join the campaign on their own initiative, which confirms the link between trust and education found in other studies (Uslaner, 2002: 90-91).
Table 6. Trust and joining through no ties.
Estimates from logistic regression analysis.
Note: Dependent variable: year of joining. * Significant at the 0.1 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. ***Significant at the 0.01 level. Entries in parentheses: standard errors.
Regression analysis gave no evidence of substantial differences of generalized trust between entrepreneurs who joined the campaign in different years. The strongest effect was found for two dimensions of vertical trust: later joiners had more trust in the police forces but also in political parties and trade unions (see Appendix, table 13).
The full model
Several factors have proved relevant when analysing the factors that pushed the entrepreneurs to join Addiopizzo’s anti-racketeering campaign at different points in time. Respondents with organisational membership in action groups tended to join the campaign earlier than members of trade associations. With regard to recruiting ties, we found that recruitment through bonding ties were more frequent among early joiners, whereas later joiners were increasingly invited through bridging ties. Later joiners were also more likely to know someone who had already joined the campaign. Descriptive data on generalised trust showed that trust levels were higher among those joining in Palermo than in southern Italy in general, which is probably due to the high educational level among the joiners. There was no statistically significant difference over time with regard to generalised trust, however. Early joiners were not more trusting than later joiners. Yet, an interesting finding was that entrepreneurs who joined the campaign on their own initiative had higher levels of generalised trust and higher levels of education than other groups of joiners. When testing these variables in a full model, all the results remained (see table 7).
Table 7. Full model and year of joining the campaign (dependent variable).
Estimates from OLS regression
Note: Dependent variable: year of joining (1-7). * Significant at the 0.1 level. **Significant at the 0.05 level. ***Significant at the 0.01 level. Entries in parentheses: standard errors. All VIF values were between 1.083 and 1.111 and all tolerance values were between .892 and .944, which indicates that multicollinearity was not a factor and that variances of the regression coefficients were not inflated.
A decision based on reflection
The findings presented above neglect the personal reflections of the entrepreneurs. Although we know that many of the entrepreneurs joined the campaign through organisational networks or were recruited by Addiopizzo activists, and that trust seemed to matter for those joining on their own initiative, we do not know their motivations for joining.
Informal discussions with about 100 entrepreneurs revealed diverse reasons for joining the campaign. Many respondents expressed a strong personal commitment to “supporting legality” and rejecting any kind of “abuse of power”. Despite continuing threats and acts of violence against their companies they refused to surrender to the mafia. Instead of paying for protection, they would rather close their business and move. Several respondents referred to a strong family tradition of resisting the mafia.
In some cases this tradition included previous generations and historic events in Sicilian history in which their relatives had participated. To many, joining was an act of “faith”, “a question of principles”, “moral”, “an ideology” or represented “an act of civicness”.
Many referred to the assassinations of judges Falcone and Borsellino, in 1992, and the strong civic reactions to their murders, which had generated a feeling in this generation, now in their 40s, that “one ought to do something”. As noted elsewhere, the average age of the entrepreneurs was 45, which means that they were in their early 20s in 1992, when those murders occurred. Most likely, it was a formative period for many young Palermitans, including the instigators of Addiopizzo’s campaign. In a few cases the respondents referred to generational differences and a refusal to surrender to “antiquated traditions”.
A few entrepreneurs mentioned their friendship with the family of Libero Grassi, who was killed by the mafia in 1991. Along with a commitment against the mafia, this seemed important to their decision to join. Several respondents had had experiences abroad or in other regions in Italy that had made them more aware of the situation in Palermo. In other cases the operators had moved back to Sicily and Palermo and expressed a wish to contribute to the development of the South. A few people referred to strength in numbers (l’unione fa la forza) as a reason for joining. Some said they had previously paid the pizzo but stopped because they wanted to be good examples for their children.
More concrete reasons for joining were also mentioned. A number of individuals said they had joined after being asked to pay protection money, or after receiving threats or attacks against their businesses58. Some respondents joined the initiative to “avoid ambiguities and problems” in their businesses, or because their trade association or business partners asked them to join. In a few cases the entrepreneurs said they had “inherited” the partnership from previous owners.
Other explanations may have influenced the decision to stop paying for protection and to join Addiopizzo’s campaign. These include fear of legal sanctions, the impact of the economic crisis, and the possibility of receiving additional benefits.
The judiciary’s ability to impose sanctions on entrepreneurs who do not cooperate with the investigators could be another incentive for entrepreneurs to stop paying and to report on racketeers. When extortion is discovered, an entrepreneur who refuses to cooperate can be accused and convicted of aiding and abetting mafia activities (La Spina, 2008: 198). Hence, the fear of future sanctions could serve as an incentive for entrepreneurs to collaborate with the justice system and, perhaps also, to join Addiopizzo’s campaign.
The economic crisis in Italy has hit southern Italy hard in general, and Palermo in particular, which may have reduced entrepreneurs’ ability to pay the pizzo. A cost that seemed tolerable before may have become unbearable for many entrepreneurs. Yet it seems that the economic crisis has increased companies’ dependence on the mafia, which can provide them with investment and financial support when they are in difficulty (SOS Impresa, 2010: 3-4). Although different mafia families approach companies in different ways, the general tendency is not for the mafia to loosen its grip on Palermitan businesses but, instead, to “make everybody pay, but pay less”.
Although very few entrepreneurs mentioned economic incentives as a reason for joining the campaign, the prospect of finding new customers through Addiopizzo’s promotion of political consumerism could have been an incentive for some (Orlando, 2012). The possibility of winning public contracts may be another economic reason for joining the anti-racket campaign. According to Act No. 94/2009, entrepreneurs who do not report their racketeers are excluded from public contracts. One respondent, a representative of a local business corporation, spontaneously mentioned the possibility of winning public bids in the future as a reason for joining the campaign63.
Economic incentives in the form of financial compensation for vandalism caused by the mafia could also have modified the cost-benefit calculation. After the murder of
Libero Grassi in 1991, anti-racket legislation was adopted in 1992, giving compensation for some of the damage caused by extortionists. It was reformed in 1999, due to its inefficiency, increasing the amount of benefits granted to rackets victims and their families (Act No. 44/1999). The sums distributed after 1999 have been more consistent, but several years after its application the compensations offered by the 1999 act still appear to be insufficient to bring about a general change in attitude (Paoli, 2007:875; La Spina, 2008: 198).
This article has analysed the Palermo business community and the anti-racketeering campaign “Change shopping habits against the pizzo” launched in 2005 by the organisation Addiopizzo. Why did the entrepreneurs join the campaign? The article analysed three different solutions to the collective action problem: mobilisation through organisations, individual recruitment, and trust.
The first hypothesis analysed whether Addiopizzo mobilised entrepreneurs through existing organisations, differentiating between different types of organisations. Qualitative evidence confirms that Addiopizzo actively recruited through existing activist groups and anti-mafia organisations in the initial phase of the campaign. The results showed that entrepreneurs who joined the campaign at an earlier stage were part of action groups (peace groups, environmental organisations, local community action groups, or organisations engaged in third world issues and human rights). Entrepreneurs who joined later were more frequently members of trade associations, most likely due to policy decisions made by Confindustria in 2007 and Confcommercio in 2011, respectively, to expel members who continued to pay for protection. Hence, the first hypothesis confirmed the relevance of membership in organizations for Addiopizzo’s mobilization.
The second and third hypotheses analysed whether entrepreneurs were recruited into the campaign through bridging ties (colleagues, acquaintances etc.) or through activist ties (Addiopizzo). The results showed the limited importance of bridging ties, while the importance of contacts with activists from Addiopizzo for both information and direct recruitment was confirmed. A large share of the joiners (24%) had heard about Addiopizzo for the first time directly from activists, and more than two-thirds were invited by activists to join the campaign. Yet, it was more frequent among earlier joiners to be invited through bonding ties (family and friends), while later joiners were frequently invited through different forms of bridging ties (acquaintances, colleagues, etc.).
The fourth hypotheses analyses whether entrepreneurs with high levels of trust joined the campaign. Compared with other regions in southern Italy, generalised trust was relatively high among the joiners, equalling trust levels in northern and central Italy. There was no statistically significant difference in generalised trust between entrepreneurs who joined the campaign at different points in time. However, entrepreneurs who joined the campaign on their own initiative tended to be more trusting and had a higher educational level than other joiners. Hence, the hypothesis about the importance of generalised trust was confirmed.
Altogether, these results show different solutions to the collective action problem through mobilisation through organisations, individual recruitment of entrepreneurs, and the importance of information campaigns and generalised trust for the mobilisation of entrepreneurs who joined the campaign on their own initiative.
The fifth hypotheses analysed the mobilising mechanism and their variation over time. As shown above, membership in organisations and type of recruiting ties varied over time, but not the respondents’ level of generalised trust.
Addiopizzo’s campaign is interesting from a theoretical perspective and shows the possibility of turning circles of non-cooperation into ones of cooperation. Societies are not doomed to eternal situations of non-cooperation, but it is possible to turn vicious circles of non-cooperation into cooperation in a relatively short period of time. The three perspectives analysed in this article are complementary and show the potential for social movements to bring about social and cultural change in contexts marked by high risk, distrust, and a lack of cooperative tradition. From a policy perspective, the campaign is interesting since it emphasises the importance of a third-party enforcer, in this case Addiopizzo, to break the traditional silence around racketeering and to support entrepreneurs who are victims of racketeering.
Moreover, Addiopizzo’s initiative seems to work as it restrains the mafia’s territorial control and offers protection through strength in numbers. Statements made by mafia state’s witnesses, pentiti, indicate that the mafia is reluctant to approach companies that are part of the campaign. According to the collaborator Giuseppe di Maio, who belonged to Cosa Nostra and used to collect protection money in a district in central Palermo, those who are part of Addiopizzo’s campaign are not asked for the pizzo because it leads to “more problems and hassle than the money we collect, and therefore it’s not worth it … hitting the rebels, all rebels, is not possible, it leads to social alarm, and the reaction of the state gets harsher”.
Addiopizzo’s mobilisation against protection money in Palermo should not be understood as an isolated initiative but recognised as long-term cultural change involving increased demands from citizens in Palermo to restrain the influence of organised crime.
The research project is financed by the Swedish Research Council. The author is thankful for useful comments from colleagues at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, the Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, della Società e dello Sport, Università di Palermo, and participants at the ECPR workshop organized by the Standing Group on Organized Crime, Bordeaux 2013. The author thanks two anonymous reviewers for their comments.
Table 8. Number of joiners by area in Palermo
Source: Addiopizzo, www.addiopizzo.org, 130522
Table 9. Factor analysis of membership in organisations
Note: Entries are rotated, varimax, factor loadings.
Factor loadings above the cut-off point 0.5 are presented in bold. Explained variance: 65.7 %.
Table 10. Factor analysis of trust measures
Entries are rotated, varimax, factor loadings. Explained variance: 62.5 %
Table 11. Factor analysis of vertical trust
Note: Entries are rotated, varimax, factor loadings. Explained variance: 65.1 %.
Table 12a. Hearing about the campaign (correlation matrix)
* Significant at the 0.1 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 12b. Invitation to join the campaign (correlation matrix)
*Significant at the 0.1 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 13. Trust and its variation over time (OLS regressions)
Note: Dependent variable: year of joining. * Significant at the 0.1 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level.
***Significant at the 0.01 level. Entries in parentheses: standard errors.
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 See Addiopizzo’s home page at www.addiopizzo.com.
 Senior police officer, the Flying Squad, Palermo. Interview May 4, 2012. “Ecco il libro mastro di Lo Piccolo”, La Repubblica, December 27, 2007.
 Nino di Matteo, Prosecutor, Palazzo di Giustizia. Interview May 3, 2012. See also “Illegalità targata recessione così la crisi ha moltiplicato truffe, racket e rapine”, La Repubblica, April 26, 2013.
 The survey data was collected by Carina Gunnarson (University of Uppsala), Francesca Forno, and Giulio Pizzuto (University of Bergamo, Italy), in October-December 2011, and in April 2012.
 The owner of a small-sized company on the outskirts of Palermo said that the local mob started to show up several times a day, asking for 2-3 euros each time. The sum eventually reached 4,000 euros per year, which
 For example, Stolle has shown that civic citizens tend to self-select into voluntary organisations (Stolle, 1998; 2003). The time spent in voluntary associations is limited in contrast to other social contexts (Newton 1999).
Different types of organisations may have different effects on their members (Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999;
 “Did someone invite you to join the campaign “Contro il pizzo cambia i consumi?” Possible answers: “a family member”, “a friend”, “a colleague working in my neighbourhood”, “a colleague (general)”, “a neighbour”, “a customer”, “an activist from Addiopizzo or Libero Futuro”, “Nobody asked, I contacted Addiopizzo myself”, “Nobody asked, I contacted Libero Futuro myself and then joined the campaign”, “other, specify”.
 The category corresponds to Granovetter’s “weak ties”.
 “Nobody asked, I contacted Addiopizzo/Libero Futuro myself and joined”.
 Two possible answers: need to be very careful (1), most people can be trusted (2).
 Each question had four possible answers: none at all (1), not very much (2), quite a lot (3), and a great deal (4).
The answers in the index followed a normal distribution curve.
 For each question there were four possible answers: none at all (1), not very much (2), quite a lot (3), and a great deal (4).
 The variable ranges from 2005 (1) to 2011 (7).
 The values range from 1 to 6, where 1 denotes “no formal education” and 6 “four-year university-level education”.
 “Less than 2 years” (1), “from 3 to 5 years” (2), “from 6 to 10 years” (3), “more than 10 years” (4).
 It was not possible to meet with 42 owners, for various reasons (”no time”, “not in Palermo”, “not there”); 24 owners refused to participate in the survey; 21 returned the questionnaire uncompleted. Fifteen companies had closed or moved; eight were not found at the indicated address.
 Areas included in the sample: Altarello, Libertà, Noce, Malaspina-Palagonia, Montepellegrino, OretoStazione, Pallavicino, Palazzo Reale-Monte di Pietà, Partanna-Mondello, Politeama, Resuttana-San Lorenzo, Settecannoli, Tommaso Natale-Sferracavallo, Tribunali-Castellamare, Uditore-Passo di Rigano, Cuba and Zisa.
 Many of these were in Termini Imerese or Carini, 30-40 kilometres from Palermo. Others were located farther away, for example, Erice, Gela, Messina, Trapani, Catania, etc.
 Services include stamping, printing, design, organisation of events, editorial services, publicity, insurance, financing, administration, computer services, office equipment, security, elderly care, and bus services.
 Sixteen percent of the clients were from other areas in Sicily, 11 percent from other areas in Italy, and 6 percent from abroad.
 Fifty-eight percent had existed for more than 10 years, 20 percent between 6 and 10 years, 16 percent from 3 to 5 years and 6 percent for less than 2 years.
 Ugo Forello, President of Comitato Addiopizzo, November 14, 2013.
 Marco Siino, former activist, November 21, 2013.
 Marco Siino, former activist, November 21, 2013.
 Grassi was killed by the mafia in August 1991 as a consequence of his attempts to mobilise other entrepreneurs.
 “Confcommercio, stretta antiracket”, La Repubblica, October 11, 2011. Confcommercio, No. 82, March 2011.
 The average is based on the total number of memberships. Median=3, mode=1.
 Piero Cassarà, personal communication.
 Marco Siino, former activist, November 21, 2013.
 Piero Cassarà, former activist, personal communication.
 Marco Siino, former activist, November 21, 2013.
 Respondents: 152, 193, 246, 335, 367, 405, 432, 611, 639, 644.
 Piero Cassarà, former activist, informal communication.
 “One cannot be too careful”: North-West 59%; North-East 67%; Central 66%; South 79%; Islands 80%. European Values Survey 2008, Table 62.
 Trust in the justice system: North-West 38%; North-East 38%; Central 34%, South 38; Islands 25%. Trust in the police: North-West 74%, North-East 82%; Central 69%; South 73%; Islands 84%.
 Cross-tabulations show a strong correlation between the two variables “Hearing about Addiopizzo for the first time” and “Being invited to join”. Chi square tests were significant at a 99 percent level of significance. Cramer’s V (.407) indicates a strong correlation between the two variables. Of 74 entrepreneurs who joined on their own initiative, 51 percent received information about Addiopizzo for the first time from media, and 27 percent from an activist.
 Respondents: 200, 366, 558, 608, 641.
 Respondent 43.
 Respondents: 365, 684.
 Respondents: 34, 267, 268, 368, 431, 441, 455, 614, 627, 680, 684.
 Respondents: 538, 628.
 Respondent 152.
 Respondents: 151, 200, 452, 480.
 Respondents: 186, 234.
 Respondent: 469.
 Respondent: 19.
 Respondent: 47.
 Respondents: 152, 441.
 Respondents: 41, 459, 475.
 Respondents: 186, 282.
 Respondents: 432, 538, 627.
 Respondents: 572, 193. 58 Respondents: 11, 312.
 Respondents: 282, 366.
 Respondents: 8, 468, 611.
 Respondents: 197, 556, 700.
 Transcrime, 2008: 142; Nino di Matteo, Prosecutor, Palazzo di Giustizia. Interview May 3, 2012. 63 Respondent: 213.
 Concluding statement. Proc. Nr. 15325/2012 R.G.N.R. Nr 9067/2012 R.G. GIP. The Court in Palermo.